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During the period of National Socialist government in Germany the 
country came close to self-sufficiency in food. Once the war was over the 
victors attempted to maximise domestic output in order to restrict imports 
of foodstuffs, and essentially this paper tries to explain why this policy 
did not succeed. Even before the end of hostilities soil fertility was in 
sharp decline (due largely to a lack of artificial fertiliser). This was to 
continue after the war, which may be attributed to an overall lack of farm 
requisites of all types. The partition of Germany into four zones (on a 
quite arbitrary basis in economic terms) made this much worse, at a time 
when refugees were coming into the western zones in large numbers.
Allied attempts to convert pasture land into arable, and so produce 
food for direct human consumption, were frustrated by a number of related 
factors, in addition to the two named above. Farmers were reluctant to run 
down pig and cattle stocks, which limited the amount of land available for 
growing cereals, potatoes and sugar-beet, which yield far more calories per 
hectare than does animal husbandry. Sowing targets for such products were 
therefore never reached in any zone. Land reform in the Soviet Zone cer­
tainly lowered output there still further, and both the Russians and the 
French did take some available foodstuffs for their own occupation forces. 
In the British and American Zones the failure to achieve desired production 
levels was accompanied by the inability of the occupiers to enforce the 
delivery of food from the farms to the urban areas; this was especially the 
case once the Germans themselves took on the supervision of this from 1st 
January 1947. This was to some extent due to negligence, but also to the 
fact that de-nazification lowered the efficiency of German agrarian 
administration.
The crucial factor in Germany from 1945 to 1949 was the link between 
coal and food. Shortages of the second held back output of the first, which 
limited industrial activity in general. As this inhibited an adequate supply 
of farm requisites peasants were obliged to resort to barter food illegally 
to obtain them. Thus from an initial lack of proper food supplies the whole 






















































































































































































"The world had never before known a situation in which four peoples 
lived and tried to co-operate in a country inhabited by a fifth.
This quotation adequately summarises the problems for the Allies 
involved in the management of agriculture and food supplies in Ger­
many after the National Socialist surrender. During the war 
Germany was supplied mainly from indigenous resources when only
approximately 10-15/6 of its food consumption came from outside pre-
(2)war frontiers. After the end of hostilities the Allies were
faced with the same question of how to maximise dcmestic product­
ion, and distribute it evenly among the population, as had been 
the Hitler regime. This chapter, therefore, will not deal with 
Allied food imports into Bizonia except briefly, since these only 
arose through failure in domestic output and deliveries.
Although the occupying powers experienced familiar problems in 
agriculture there were now important differences in degree, some 
of which the National Socialists had already begun to feel prior 
to 194.5, due to the effects of the war. These included the 
lack of machinery and spare parts, of fertiliser for the soil, the 
destruction of farm buildings and transport facilities by fighting 
and bombing, and the presence of minefields on agricultural land. 
Additionally, after 194.5 the Allies had to cope with the Zonal 
divisions consequent upon surrender. Before an analysis of 
Allied food policy can be attempted a brief survey has to be given 
of the state in which German agriculture found itself by 1944 > 
to put the problems in some kind of perspective.
The lack of equipment and of artificial fertiliser sharply in­
creased as hostilities dragged on. As agriculture in Germany 




























































































matter, and began to affect crop yields quite considerably. Overall 
soil fertility was down by 1944. to about 8056 of prewar, according to 
one investigation.^ There is little doubt that this was due princi­
pally to lack of nitrogen and phosphate, the supply of which by 1944 - 
45 came to only about 5056 of the prewar figure. ̂
As the war increasingly reached Germany itself the total areas sown
with principal crops also declined; the net result was catastrophic
in terms of indigenous production.^ Since yields were also down,
the total available supplies had fallen quite sharply by the 1944
( n )harvest. Thus the occupying powers were faced with a grim situ­
ation in 1945, as German food output was dropping sharply on exhausted
(8)soil in a country devastated by war. '
In addition, Four Power control presented a new problem, that of Zonal
division, which had serious implications for both east and west Ger -
(9)many, as agriculturally they had been complementary prior to 1945.
That this might be difficult to continue after the war had occurred to 
the British in 1944, when it was estimated that if eastern surpluses 
were not forthcoming, North West Germany would have a food deficit of 
about 1 million tons in bread grain, ^  to % million tons of potatoes 
and ^ million tons of meat and sugar, This was exacerbated by
the decision of the Four Power Council in November 1945 to return 
6,500,000 ethnic Germans back into the old Reich. By January 1st 
1946 the population density by zone varied greatly, from 268 in the 
US Zone and 270 in the French, to 285 in the Soviet Zone and as high 
as 370 in the British. In sum, the British Zone was the most
seriously disadvantaged of all the occupied areas.
ALLIED PUNS
The concept of maximising agrarian output laid down at Potsdam was 





























































































first was the need to concentrate on direct consumption crops. This 
rationale already underlay the Hot Springs International Food Confer­
ence, Resolution XII, in 194-3. It was agreed there that the best 
way of combatting post-war world food shortages would be to produce 
grain and potatoes directly for human consumption, rather than by 
concentrating on animal husbandry and dairy farming.
The Allies were therefore following a precedent laid down both by 
Hot Springs and the NSDAF in Germany. To obtain additional land 
for grain and potatoes etc, it would probably be necessary to reduce 
livestock herds so that the land normally used for grazing or grow­
ing root fodder could be utilised for produce for direct human 
consumption. Hence quadripartite objectives included an increase
in sown areas of direct consumption crops of 15% in 1945-6, as com-
(12)pared to the previous year. Unfortunately these targets were
not attained. Overall only 89.4/5 of the 1938 sown acreage was 
reached, against the target figure of 97.0^. Although the goals 
had been reached in respect of grain, this was not the case for 
pulses, oil seeds, and potatoes, most important of all. Zonally 
the level of success for overall sowings varied considerably, with 
the Soviet Zone (94.8^) and the UK Zone (92.656) best, and the US 
Zone (83.8/5) and the French (72.8^) some way behind to give the 
national average of 89.455. In addition what diminished supplies 
of indigenous food still further was the fall in actual yields per 
Ha, which were virtually duplicated in the following year.
Before the war Germany had been able to guarantee about 83% of its 
foodstuffs from within its own borders, or the equivalent of 2500 
calories per head daily to the non-farming population. The drop 
in both the extent of cultivated areas and of yields clearly threat­
ened to reduce the rations available to am amount well below prewar 




























































































has to be seen as a serious setback and one which applied in varying 
degrees to all four zones. The question has to be raised as to 
how and why this came about. Undoubtedly partition was the reason, 
as it left the implementation of allied targets to each zonal author­
ity as the Soviet delegate on the quadripartite Food and Agriculture 
Coordinating Committee insisted. This meant that the provis­
ion of the Potsdam Agreement that Germany should be treated as one 
economic unit wa3 already dead.
Levels of Modernisation in German Agriculture and the failure to 
attain targets.
There are various factors to be examined under this heading. To 
restore German agriculture by 1949 to full prewar production levels 
which was the medium-term objective of the occupying forces,an ample 
supply of farm equipment was required. Here, the problem of wartime 
damage to industry, and the permitted level of industry in post-war 
Germany became vital. Overall, if the steel required for the manu­
facture of machinery is included, agriculture's yearly need in the US
and British Zones amounted to 681,000 tons, at a time when their annual
( 1 6 )quota was only 76,835 tons.
An additional problem was artificial fertiliser, on which the food out-
(17)put depended to a large extent. Here the partition of Germany
was a decisive area as the various zones were complementary. The
(18)Soviet area had, for example, 60? of all national potash deposits;
So although the allocation of fertiliser requirements for the whole 
country was done on paper jointly by the allied powers, the actual 
supplies made available fell far short of those needed, as the distri­
bution of 75? of 1938-9 use was in principle only, rather than in 
practice. In fact, actual supplies available never attained the 75% 
t a r g e t , T h e  real crux of the matter was a lack of co-operation 




























































































ages, which also hampered fertiliser output.
In effect the British were caught in a dilemma: if they sent coal
to other zones to make fertiliser they earned 09 a ton or a ster­
ling equivalent. If they retained the coal in the Ruhr to
make fertilisers the savings in extra grain output was far greater 
since it cost 30 much to import. A tons of coal sold abroad paid 
for 1 ton of imported wheat, but had the fuel stayed in Germany ,
the nitrogen it made would enable an additional 10 tons of grain
( 21)to be produced at home. As one official put it "if we had
not had to export so much (coal) we should be better off for ferti-
(22)liser manufacture." The British continued to export coal under
pressure from their European allies, whilst the grain shortfall thus
produced inside their zone forced UK taxpayers to subsidise food 
(23)sent to Germany.
In June 194-6 the UK zone commander,Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto 
Douglas, proposed a moratorium on coal exports for A months at least 
to enable more steel, consumer goods and fertiliser to be made in 
the British Zone, which would have had a really beneficial effect 
on food output. This proposal was debated by ministers when Hynd, 
the British Minister for Germany, admitted that the idea "would 
pay substantial dividends" economically. But he accepted never­
theless that the Foreign Office, the Treasury and the Americans 
were against any suspension of Ruhr exports on political grounds: 
as he put it, "we must be prepared to accept a policy of deliber­
ate impoverishment of the British Zone for the sake of the liber­
ated countries, and consequently r therefor», a continuation of
( 2/1
the financial burdens on the UK".
However accurate a summary this might have been of the British 




























































































moratorium on coal exports in favour of more deliveries to other 
zones in Germany was not raised. If a genuine Four Power regime
had existed in Germany the UK would have given priority to coal
shipments from the Ruhr to other zones, instead of to European
allies. Since the British were caught in a web of international
relations their zone in Germany had to suffer, which continued to
entail less fertiliser etc, and therefore less food,for the whole
country.
Of almost equal importance for food supplies was the lack of seeds
in the immediate postwar era, especially in the west, since prewar
the east had been the seedbed for the whole country, and zonal div-
(25)ision was therefore of crucial importance in this matter as well;
This meant that a great deal of land ploughed up for crops could
not be planted, as there were no seeds available. In the British
Zone alone there was a shortfall for 1945-6 of 200,000 tons of seed
potatoes, 30,000 tons for green vegetables and 225,000 tons for
(26)cereals; ' The failure to convert even larger areas of grazing 
in order to plant direct consumption crops is partly attributable 
to this shortage and represented a further restriction on farm out­
put.
Other factors inhibiting output and inter-zonal food transfers
Thus a whole row of technical problems prevented maximisation of 




























































































two of them political and one socio-economic. The first politic­
al decision was the Zonal division of the country, which cut 
right across the normal patterns of German agriculture, and 
militated against bigger output, and against inter-zonal food 
exchanges. The real crux of the matter was the failure to ob­
tain a central agrarian administration for the whole country , 
for which both the British and Americans had pushed initiall^f^ 
Neither the French, nor the Soviets, would accept this idea with­
out reservations. In particular, Sokolovsky, the Soviet dele­
gate, laid down that the question of a central agency for food 
and agriculture could only be considered in the general context 
of similar organisations for all economic sectors, and therefore 
could not be discussed in isolation; ' This dragged the
discussions on so that no effective instrument was set up before 
the onset of the "Cold War" which precluded any overall super - 
vision of food exchanges.
Another question is the extent to which any surplus supplies did
exist in the Soviet Zone in view of the comment made by Sokolovsky
to Robertson. When the exchange of steel from the UK Zone against
food from the Soviets was mooted, their representative pointed out
that there were not enough food reserves in the Soviet Zone to
(29)enable it to be executed anyway; Here the second political 
factor in the food equation has to be considered, the effect of 
land reform in the Soviet Zone.
The Soviet Zone Land Reform
In the latter area "Agriculture was dominated from the first by the 
proposed land r e f o r m " T h e  western allies were certain that 




























































































under the slogan "Junker land in peasant hand" large estates were 
split up into allegedly uneconomic units. There are two factors 
to consider here, the first being delivery to the market. Broadly 
speaking, the larger the farm unit the higher the percentage of 
its produce which it sent for general consumption outside the farm 
itself.
Secondly, what the western allies also believed was that breaking 
up of estates into smallholdings without adequate supplies of seed, 
fertiliser, tools or even proper farm buildings would diminish over­
all production as well. As they said, "No competent German agri­
culturist would deny that the way in which the reforms have been
carried through will have a serious effect on the efficiency of
"(31)farming for several years in eastern Germany;
However, it has to be underlined that output also fell in the 1946
harvest for the western zones. The crux of the matter is , did
production fall more heavily in the east than in the west, and if
so, was land reform at least partly responsible? To the first
(32)question the answer certainly seems to be affirmative; Decline
in the Soviet Zone was clearly greater than in any western zone ,
especially in grain, which as Nettl implies (for technical reas-
(33)ons) meant that organisational changes had been responsible.' ; 
this would suggest that the land reform was in itself at least 
partly to blame. But the whole issue i3 clouded by the presence 
of other factors.
One farm expert reported very adversely on the general state of the 
Zone in October-November 1945, at a time when land reform had been 
scarcely implemented. It is clear that the actual policy of living 




























































































responsible for this, especially in respect of livestock, including 
draught horses. As he put it "the general picture of the fann­
ing areas east of the River Elbe is that of an industry which is
(3/)going through a deep economic and social depression." ' The 
loss of livestock in itself meant that natural manure was lacking. 
When the shortage of artificial fertilisers, seeds, etc., is added 
it was clear that a serious fall in output would take place in any 
event. Overall it seems reasonable to infer that gloomy predict­
ions of the results of land reform were probably accurate to a 
large degree. But other factors also existed, such as general 
shortages and Red Army occupation. The net effect was that
(35)little food was available for delivery to the over-populated west. 
Food Collection
The third factor which inhibited a better food supply in post-war 
Germany was food collection, rather than production as sucht here 
the main problem was inducing German fanners to part with their pro­
ducts via the legal means of distribution, rather than exchange 
them on the Black Market, against consumer goods, or articles needed 
for production. There seems little point in accusing German farm­
ers of a lack of discipline. Not only had National Socialist con­
trol gone, but also the patriotic motive of winning the war for their 
country had disappeared with its defeat. ' Moreover, for those 
who still had confidence in the Reichsmark, they could sell produce 
illegally for inflated returns, since the occupying powers fixed 
farm prices to prevent inflation. (Note circulation in Germany 
stood at 13 billion R.M. in 1939 and 70 billion in 1945 
Richer returns could be obtained therefore on the Black Market .
For the majority of peasants who had lost confidence in the currency 
and needed certain articles, exchanging food for barter was an easy 




























































































dispose of goods for cash" was reported..... "the barter of comnodi- 
ties in short supply is widespread."^ A further point was the
reluctance of peasants to cull their livestock as the western allies 
wished. Peasants tended to use animal herds as a criterion of 
wealth, and wanted therefore to diminish this asset as little as 
possible as particularly this type of farming paid better than arable. 
Additionally the reduction of pig holding by the Natiohal Socialist
regime brought down stocks from 27 million in 1938-39 to 18.6 mill-
( 39)ion in 1944. The last thing owners now felt like doing was to
cut numbers still further, especially as pork and pig fat could be 
traded for consumer goods. Culling cattle herds also foundered 
on the structure of peasant farming in the south and west based on 
relatively small units. A military government ordinance to reduce 
herds by 1056 sounded like common sense in principle, but how could 
it be applied in practice on smallholdings? In Bavaria, 8056 of 
cattle owners had six head or fewerj and in Wtirtteraberg-Baden , 
about one half had fewer than four cows. Reductions therefore
constituted a serious threat to their livelihood, and they conse­
quently fought the Anglo-American demand for a full 1056 cut. This 
had three consequences.
In the first place, it wrecked the whole rationale of replacing pre­
war deliveries of grain, beet and potatoes from the east by plough­
ing up grassland to grow such staples in the west. The British 
conceded that a livestock-slaughter policy was hard to enforce, as 
farmers insisted on regarding it as a punitive occupation measure,
"and its implementation requires stringent supervision and heavy 
penalties for non-compliance."^^ In the US Zone the same type
of evasion resulted in an estimated loss of 306,000 tons of wheat
(42)equivalent^ for human consumption;^"' It was clear to the occu­




























































































in order to disguise from the Allies that they still possessed more 
head of cattle than they showed on official returns.
For the 1947 harvest, British sources estimated that although farmers 
should have sown 2̂ - million Ha. with bread grain against l£ million Ha. 
for fodder, the real results were 2 million and 1.8 million respective­
ly j they 3aw no reason for this other than the need to feed the
(43)illegally-high herds of cattle. Similar reports had already eman­
ated from the US Zone, where sample checks showed actual seeded areas 
in general to be u n d e r s t a t e d I n  other words, what German peas­
ants were really interested in was growing fodder for animals, many
(4 5 )of whom they should have killed. The outcome was a loss equival­
ent to 1.6 million tons of flour from the 1947 harvest. The British 
administration also failed to reach targets for sown hectarage for 
potatoes. Ministry of Agriculture experts from London required 
either 1 million Ha. sown, or 750,000 Ha. in the event of further 
live-stock reduction»! the 1946 actual figure amounted to only 
469,000 H a . S i n c e  the normal yield in the UK Zone in 1946 
was 127 Dz. per Ha. (=12.7 tons) the shortfall of 280,000 Ha.(even 
if the modest target of 750,000 Ha. had been adopted) represented 
over 3i million tons of potatoes for one zone in one year. In retro­
spect it is interesting to note that the tendency among peasants to
understate the amount of land used for animal feeding-stuffs had al-
(47)ready begun before the end of the war. Under the western allies
the practice of feeding grain, potatoes and even milk to animals went - 
on increasingly, which seriously diminished supplies for human consump­
tion.
Another important aspect of the allied failure to reduce livestock 
has to be considered, as the continued presence of large herds furnish­
ed farmers with exactly the means required to engage in Black Market 




























































































Of course, the food so traded still found its way to the non-farming 
population who were the counterpart to the peasants in Black Market 
dealing. But the essential point here is that evasion prevented the 
fair and equitable distribution of supplies. In sum,animal husbandry 
is an inefficient way of producing food in an emergency,and therefore 
it has to be borne in mind that the continuance of large cattle herds, 
contrary to Allied wishes, lowered the overall calorific yield of 
German agriculture.
Despite cattle stocks, ironically enough the Allies were never able 
to get an adequate supply of milk in the west, since it disappeared 
in the making of illegal butter. This in its turn lowered the quan­
tity of fats available to the non-farming population. Since this trend 
continued into 1947, the fats ration remained low for Bizonia at the 
miserable level of 200 grammes per 28 day ration period, a wholly 
derisory figure, the equivalent of only 51 calories per day.
If the presence of over large cattle stocks was one problem, the ill­
egal (or "black”) slaughtering of pigs was another. Again, the
official culling programmes were carried out more efficiently in the 
UK Zone than in the US area.^; But in both zones peasants were 
concealing large numbers of pigs from the authorities, in order to
use the meat and fats on the Black Market. Reports to this effect
(49)were frequent for both areas. Infractions of the law in the US
Zone were on such a scale that a special report was compiled on the 
subject. It suggested that through illegal slaughtering from Dec­
ember 1945 to the same month of 1946, of all pigs, 72/6 of sheep 
and 2yf= of cattle were being killed outside stated regulations.
The estimated loss in supplies to normal channels of distribution 
amounted to 138,000 tons of meat and 9,000 tons of fats in 1945 - 6 
alone, a huge loss in calorific terms. So the western allies had 




























































































stocks diverted food from direct human consumption, and even when killed, 
the neat, fats and milk went on a large scale to the Black Market.
Distribution
A further issue which concerned food supplies was the problem of how 
to control the movement of foodstuffs within districts and regions, ac 
from these with a surplus to deficit areas. This was clearly affect­
ed by the inability of the occupying powers to agree to a new central 
agency following the breakdown of the National Socialist centralisat­
ion in the shape of the Reichsnflhrstand!^ What the allies found 
on arrival in Germany was a reversion to agrarian autonomy in each 
district. (Kreisautarkie). Each ally dealt with this in his own 
way in his own zone.
The British had decided in 1944. to continue with the Reichsndhrstand 
(RNS) as far as possible. 1 A report made by an official investi­
gator sent from the UK in early 1945 supported this intention by say­
ing of farmers "Many of them are asking if this system is to be con­
tinued. It appears to have satisfied then and brought the food off 
the farms." This was the crux of the matter for the British 1
their point of departure was wholly pragmatic. Thus existing officials 
of the RNS were to be left in office for administrative reasons, and 
should not be dismissed merely in virtue of being members of the RNS,
but only if they were proven National Socialists of long standing!"^
An impending food crisis therefore took precedence for the British •
Initially they restored the RNS at district and village level under 
their own Regional Food Teams of specialist British officers. Event­
ually they were forced to set up a central agency staffed by Germans 
for their own zone, known as the German Interregional Office for f.vod 
and Agriculture (Gifac), which early in 1946 assumed executive powers 
in a zone where no regional government existed! Its head was




























































































the Central Office of Food and Agriculture for the British Zone (ZEL) 
also under him, charged with overall supervision of food in all its 
aspects, but still using the old RNS (albeit purged) as its local 
organ.
In the US Zone (as in the French) a somewhat different system applied 
in that the individual regions (Lânder) were given responsibility for 
food and agriculture eventually with an overall plenipotentiary for 
the zone as co-ordinator: this was Dr. Dietrich, onetime Agricul­
ture Minister and an ex-member of the Liberal DSP. His office was 
unlike Schlange-Schfiningens, in that he had to cope with regional 
authorities. Once the British and US Zones merged economically frcm 
1 January 1947 a new organisation for what was now Bizonia came into 
being, the office for Food, Agriculture and Forestry (VELF),first at 
Stuttgart and then at Frankfurt. Its initial head was Dietrich who 
ceded his position on health grounds in mid- 1947 to be replaced by 
Schlange-Schttningen. So in principle a bizonal agency now existed 
for both production and the centralised distribution of foodstuffs. 
Theoretically the two western allies had found the next best solu­
tion to an all German administration. Unfortunately four things 
impeded it3 efficient operation in practice.
For the Linder still retained the last word: VELF could issue
instructions to them, but had no means of implementing them itself,
and was dependent on Linder good will. This was not the arrange -
ment that the British and North Germans desired, but in preliminary
(56)
negotiations they were overruled by the Americans and South Germans,
The result was crucial since at a time of short supply the food
surplus regions were reluctant to comply with instructions to send
foodstuffs to deficit areas, such as the Ruhr. In Bavaria, the
chief agricultural area for the south, the erection of VELF was
greeted by a broadcast by the Food Minister Baumgartner, which app-
(57)




























































































It soon became clear that VSIF1 directives were not being followed in
the south, where it was suggested that to forego food in Bavaria in
order to send it elsewhere would merely encourage regional separat­
es)
ism. Failure to send supplies north naturally evoked sharp crit­
icism there where Robertson the Deputy Military Governor deprecated
open attacks on "the alleged selfishness of the southern Lânder",
(59)
which he felt would make things worse. Indeed, public bickering
between Baumgartner and Lübke, Food Minister in North Rhine-Westphalia 
became commonplace, and others joined in the mutual recriminations .
Particularism was not confined in any way to the southern Lânder but 
represented a general tendency of the times: the "Meat War"b«ttti»n
Bavaria and the north was paralleled by a "Potato War" in late 
1947, due to non-delivery of this staple item from Lower Saxony to 
other areas. The net result was less food for the non-farming popu­
lation, in the latter instance the amount being 558,000 tons of pot­
atoes below delivery quotas, two thirds of which had been due from
(6 0)
Lower Saxony. Overall the British authorities estimated that coll­
ection and distribution failures in Bizonia diminished the official
(61)
supply of meat and fats by 2%  for the urban consumer.
But the second factor which affected collection was at least equally 
important, namely, the attitude of individual districts or even Till­
ages. Particularism existed at this level as well,so that it would 
be an error to suppose that low deliveries from Bavaria or Lower 
Saxony necessarily meant that the urban population in those areas
lived well: broadly speaking, it was only the farm population who
(6 2)
did in any region. Thus VELF complaints that their directives 
were not carried out by the Lânder usually meant in practice that 
the districts and parishes were ignoring those from regional govern-
(63)
ment in their turn. In Bavaria it was said that district offi­




























































































policy, and justified it with the word "democracy" as they were all
(64)
locally elected and looked after their own areas first.
Since this also happened in North Rhine-V/estphalia it was difficult 
to see how officials there could complain about non-arrival of supp­
lies from other Lânder, when they were not making full collections 
(65)
in their own area. In May 1947 the British accused North Rhine-
Westphalia of being the worst region for grain deliveries in the UK
( 66)
Zone. In the case of potatoes, however, farmers had a convinc­
ing excuse for non-fulfillment of quotas for delivery: many were
(67)
simply stolen by the hungry urban population.
A third issue was German goodwill in executing allied orders: how
greatly its lack affected deliveries is difficult to determine in 
retrospect, but certainly it contributed to general difficulties .
The British complained of the regional Food Ministry in North Rhine- 
Westphalia that it did little to jsass on to the general public infor­
mation about world food shortages. In another region inability to 
obtain statistics from the local food administration led a British
officer to report "The German official can be very evasive indeed
(69)
when he likes, and in this matter he does like." Food difficul­
ties in general led to a huge row between the Anglo-US authorities 
and Germans in April 1947 when an American Food and Agriculture 
official, Colonel Hester, accused the Germans of poor administration.
He was supported by the British Minister Hynd, who alleged the period
of National Socialist rule had brought in its train the lack of per-
(70)
sonal initiative which so many German officials showed. Such
criticism makes it hard to determine to what extent non-compliance
with the orders of the occupying powers, who oversaw all German agen-
(71)
cies, was due to lack of goodwill or simple inefficiency. Here a fac­
tor was de-nazification, which cannot be fully examined, but has to be
(72)




























































































In the Reichsn&hrstand many officials charged with food collection 
were themselves peasants and had little intention of employing co­
ercion against their professional colleagues for the sake of the
(73)allies or even for the urban population of their own country. 
Ultimately this was why so many peasants were able to evade their 
duty in delivering food for distribution through normal channels 
and use it for Black Market dealings. In the US Zone, with a 
different system, elected local officials had to please their 
constituents, a point noted early when complaints about collection 
were made. As one speaker put it, "parish chairmen and district 
leaders (Landr&te) don't press home orders as they are elected
(7/)every two years and are apprehensive about public opinion."' '
The allies were then left with a choice; in the UK Zone the RNS 
organisation was carried on in principle by people geared to rural 
and not urban interests who would not act against friends or rela­
tives in the village and in the US Zone by elected officials,fear­
ful of losing votes. Neither system was satisfactory.
Their deficiencies were compounded by two other matters; the first
was the need for the Germans at whatever agency to obtain allied
approval for directives. This slowed up the whole administrative
procedure, and consequently afforded both at Lânder and at local
(75)
level, the opportunity for evasion of regulations. Moreover,
allied personnel themselves were not especially numerous, nor in
(76)
many cases, particularly efficient. Criticism in the UK its­
elf of British zonal administration was frequent during the whole
(77)
occupational period. Above all, the real failure it was sugg­
ested was lack of any overall policy and of contact between Berlin
(78)
and the Zone.
It is therefore only right to remember when reading allied criticism 




























































































the main problem again was the lack of supervisors: in summer 194.6
there were only 8 US officers in the entire agrarian administration
, (79)
in Bavaria (which had 2/3rd of the total hektarage of the US Zone).
Obviously they had virtually no chance whatever of ascertaining if
anyone wa3 carrying out their directives or not. That US supervision
was in general inefficient was known to the British in late 194.5, as
currently nearly of the potato crop in the American occupation area
was being used as fodder, which the administration seemed unable to 
(80)
prevent.
This leads to a comparison between occupation policy in the west in
general and that in the Soviet Zone. There German Communist émigrés
trained in Moscow came in with the Réd Army, and on the whole, their
(81 )subsequent administration seems to have been quite satisfactory. '
The Russians swept away all National Socialist organisations and began 
from the bottom up, with the intention of giving responsibility for 
their own affairs back to the Germans. So the Reichsn&hrstand went 
and a new Department of Agriculture set up: at lower levels the
administration wa3 handled by local government. Special food committ­
ees were set up locally, on which consumers, as well as farm interests, 
(82)
were represented.
As well as abolishing the RNS, the Soviet authorities ended the system 
of demanding compulsory delivery of all produce (which the western 
allies retained). Instead, a new arrangement based on previous 
Russian experience was brought in, whereby delivery quotas per Ha.
left the peasant the chance to sell any produce over that figure on
(83)
the free market (freie Spitze). Apparently, this did not immed­
iately meet with farm approval: it was certainly regarded with some
. (8^)
scepticism by the CDU in Berlin. Apparently late in 1946 punish­
ments, sometimes arbitrary, were being inflicted by the authorities 
for failures in delivery, though often on larger farmers for more 




























































































delivery as practised in the west had failed and that some new incen­
tive had to be found.
The whole question occasioned a lively debate in the west over the 
merits of abolishing the existing system, and initiating the Soviet 
model, on which some favourable views were held. On the other hand 
it was often reported that even in the Soviet Zone difficulties were 
being axperienced in food collection. ' In January 194.7 the Minis­
ter of the Interior in Thtiringia appealed to peasants to do their 
duty, and fight the concept of the urban population procuring food
illegally from farms (Hamstern) s he demanded that the delivery
(87)system be run more honestly; Clearly this seems to imply irr­
egularities were widespread.
In retrospect it seems clear that the western allies eontinued too
long with the National Socialist system of demanding total delivery
of everything produced. Not until 1948 was a new arrangement
brought in, whereby the "freie Spitae" was used for some commodities.
Similarly it was a long time before any incentive scheme was adopted,
namely, the concept of giving farmers premiums to encourage delivery,
(88)which the National Socialists had employed during the war.' ' The 
whole problem was bedevilled by two factors, firstly, what are the 
criteria for good deliveries? An inefficient peasant surrendering 
90/5 of his output gives less to the market than the good producer who 
sends in 75/5. It was for this reason that the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture had opposed Hitler's wish to give financial incentives 
during the war, which he over-ruled
The allies in the west wanted incentives in kind. If peasants were
forced to barter food for necessities on the Grey Market, why not give
them what they wanted as a legal reward for delivery? After this
(90)
suggestion to VELF, months went by and nothing seems to have happened. 




























































































opinion within the military governments themselves. There is no 
doubt that the food administration officials wanted new incentives,
but in September 194.7 these were rejected as impracticable by the
(91)Commerce and Industry Branch due to shortages of consumer goods.
So despite the quadripartite law of 20th March 1947 which imposed 
heavy penalties on anyone dealing unlawfully in rationed goods , 
the Black Market continued to impede the equitable distribution of 
foodstuffs to the urban population.
It is clear that the use of the stick did not work, however, or as 
the military authorities put it, "the notion of combating compens­
ation trade by Inspection and judicial action alone has proven a 
*(92)complete failure; Eventually a piecemeal incentives scheme
was set up in Bizonla, giving sugar in exchange for potato deliv- 
(Q"?)eries. By then the urban population had been short of food for
three years.
Conclusion
It is clear that on the production side targets were not achieved
(94)in respect of sown areas in 1945-7 in Germany as a whole. In
the Soviet Zone this may have been due at least partly to land 
reform, and in the western zones to failure to reduce pig-cattle 
herds, and prevent food needed for human consumption being util­
ised as fodder; the general inability to control the Black Mar­
ket was significant. Shortages of fertiliser, tools,machinery 
and spare parts held back sowing and meant either that ploughing 
could not be done, or that nothing could be planted or fertilised 
in some farm land even when it had been converted from pasture • 
Failures in production were accompanied by shortcomings in the 
collection system, especially in Bizonia. Above all, the polit­
ical decision arrived at during the war to divide Germany arbi­




























































































western zones. The problem of refugees accentuated this problem of 
supply to urban areas in the west especially.
That the occupying powers were, however, able to prevent both mass 
starvation and disease at a time of world food shortages reflects 
credit on them: this point is not necessarily modified to any great
extent by the fact that the British and Americans had to resort to im­
ports in order to achieve this. Here their inability to enforce deli­
veries, true apparently also in the Soviet Zone at least to some degree, 
was crucial. Peasants and food-distributors in Germany had lived under
National Socialism for 12 years prior to the arrival of the Allies, and
(95)by 1945 they were sick of controls. There is some evidence that
attempts to enforce delivery quotas and oversee the farm population 
by representatives of other sectors were actually counter-productive 
in the postwar e r a ^ ^  Given this, and the general shortage of con­
sumer goods, a Black Market was unavoidable, as was the inability to 
reduce livestock herds: by 1943 at the latest 1 million tons of grain
were already being used unlawfully as fodder per annum. If National 
Socialist discipline and appeals to patriotism were unable to prevent 
this, foreign occupiers would have little chance of success.
Finally, two matters should be mentioned which have been omitted here. 
Firstly, the financial position of the farming population. In an era 
when economic activity frequently was reduced to barter, estimates of 
monetary income are pointless. Not until after the currency reform of 
June 1948 is an examination worthwhile. Secondly, no attempt has been 
made to deal with land reform, other than with its effect on food pro­
duction east of the Elbe. Whatever effect it had on this,land reform 
was a long-term restructuring of social and economic relations in the 
then Soviet Zonei*^ In the western zones, partly due to the inability
of the Germans of differing political persuasions to agree among them-




























































































land reform in the Soviet Zone has been followed by collectivis­
ation to some extent, a long-term contrast was created with West 
Germany, where the structure of agriculture in 194-9 was similar 
to that in 1933 and 194-5 there the period of occupation saw 
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